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After a twenty-five year lapse in time, the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee) returned to the issue of gender-
based violence, issuing General Recommendation No. 35 on 14 July 2017. Despite 
focusing on the issue of violence against women three times among the currently 37 
general recommendations (General Recommendations Nos. 12, 19 and 35) (CEDAW 
Committee 1989, 1992, 2017), the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (‘CEDAW’) fails to mention violence against women. As Margaret Keck 
and Kathryn Sikkink point out, none of the 30 articles of the otherwise comprehensive 
CEDAW contain a single word about rape, domestic or sexual abuse, female genital 
mutilation or any other instance of violence against women (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 
166). Nor is violence mentioned in the CEDAW’s preamble.1
                                                          
* Dr Ramona Vijeyarasa is a Chancellor’s Post-Doctoral Research Fellow in the Faculty of Law at the 
University of Technology Sydney. Dr Vijeyarasa has developed a Gender Legislative Index, a tool to 
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than twenty other peer-reviewed publications on law and gender issues. 
1 It is arguable that Article 6 of the Convention, aimed at stopping all forms of trafficking and the 
exploitation of prostitution of women, encapsulates two aspects of violence against women: women’s 




Despite this lack of attention to the issue of violence in CEDAW, the only human 
rights treaty globally focused on women’s rights and one that has received almost 
universal ratification, the CEDAW Committee, the treaty body formed to monitor its 
implementation, has demonstrated a substantial and noteworthy evolution in its treatment 
of the issue. Such an emphasis on the issue of violence against women is undoubtedly 
justified given that General Recommendation No. 35 describes violence against women 
as “one of the fundamental social, political and economic means by which the subordinate 
position of women with respect to men and their stereotypical roles are perpetuated” 
(CEDAW Committee 2017, para. 2).  
The Committee itself has described the latest recommendation as a “milestone” 
(CEDAW Committee 2018). In light of the CEDAW Committee’s own view of its 
General Recommendation, the purpose of this article is to evaluate the contribution made 
by the Committee to international women’s rights law through General Recommendation 
No. 35. In order to do this, I take a two-step approach. First, I ask, in what ways an update 
was necessary, analysing the two earlier General Recommendations No. 12 (1989) and 
No. 19 (1991) and placing them in their historical context. How did they come about? 
What were the challenges? What value did they add to international law? This section 
includes a discussion on the extent to which they were evolutionary for their time; the 
limitations imposed on the CEDAW Committee at those moments in history to be more 
expansive in its framing of violence from a human rights perspective; and the weakest 
parts of the 1989 and 1992 recommendations. For instance, Elizabeth Evatt, herself a 
former committee member, has shed important light on the impact of ideological 
differences among Committee members (particularly in the 1980s) on the progress and 
effectiveness of the Committee in its early years (Evatt 2002, 520).  
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Second, if such an update was required, I assess whether the CEDAW Committee 
made the most of the opportunity to advance soft law on the issue of violence. This 
analysis is set against the standards established through feminist debate and thinking on 
violence against women at particular moments in CEDAW’s history. On the basis of this 
analysis, I identify several significant areas where the CEDAW Committee could have 
done more. I identify a number of trends that could explain those shortcomings, giving 
credence, for instance, to the efforts of the CEDAW Committee to make the drafting 
process more inclusive of civil society which in turn, makes the recommendation more 
reactive to current trends and possibly dated in the years to come. 
I have chosen the instrument of the General Recommendation as the focus of this 
article for a number of reasons. Article 21 of the Convention provides for the Committee 
“to make suggestions and general recommendations based on the examination of reports 
and information received from the States Parties” (United Nations General Assembly 
1979, Art. 21). While such “suggestions” are not binding, as instruments of soft law, 
General Recommendations allow Committee members to produce progressive 
jurisprudence on the Convention; in the words of former CEDAW Committee members, 
general recommendations allow the Committee to remain relevant (Baldez 2014, 112). 
General Recommendations interpret treaties and aid States Parties to understand 
their responsibilities. General Recommendations seek to resolve areas of ambiguity, 
provide guidance on issues that have presented multiple countries with implementation 
difficulties, direct all States Parties on how to report on issues not fully specified in 
convention as well as guide governments on general issues of compliance and 
interpretation (Baldez 2014, 112). Moreover, according to the CEDAW Committee’s 
drafting process, General Recommendations allow for detailed deliberation on issues, 
including contributions by other stakeholders, namely other entities of the United Nations 
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system, non-governmental organisations and other civil society bodies (Division for the 
Advancement of Women 2009).  
Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of general 
recommendations to be both progressive and a tool for accountability. As a form of soft 
law, the ability of the CEDAW committee to maintain legitimacy vis-à-vis States Parties 
depends on careful drafting of its general recommendations, balancing this with its need 
to represent a high standard for women’s rights. This is a challenge that has confronted 
other treaty bodies, such as the Human Rights Committee who needed to “tone down” 
the drafting of General Comment No. 33 on the obligations of states parties under its 
Optional Protocol, to preserve legitimacy among States Parties (Grover 2012, 173).  It is 
important to acknowledge this balancing act as a limit on the CEDAW Committee’s 
ability to develop progressive jurisprudence that reflects the demands of women’s rights 
movements while maintaining the likelihood of States Parties’ compliance. Without such 
implementation at the national level, indeed, recommendations have limited, if any, 
value.  
In practice, assessing the impact of general recommendations is a challenging and 
untested task. One commendable effort specifically on the issue of violence against 
women, research by Neil Englehart (2014, 265), suggests that there was a time-lag when 
it came to General Recommendations No. 12 and No. 19 actually influencing the 
enactment of new laws and the establishment of institutions to support compliance. This 
is explained by the obvious interval needed to formulate programmes, for public 
awareness to spread and for people to change their behaviour. Nonetheless, Englehart’s 
research, albeit with inconsistent evidence, shows some reduction in instances of violence 
as a result of both General Recommendations No. 12 and 19 (2014, 273). 
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As we move into this critique, therefore, I take the position that first, the general 
recommendations are a fundamental tool in the hands of the human rights treaty bodies. 
Alongside the CEDAW Committee’s work under its Optional Protocol and the 
Concluding Observations issued to individual countries by the Committee, General 
Recommendations offer a space for progressive advancements on women’s rights. 
Moreover, research shows that they contribute to legal and policy change on the ground. 
Nonetheless, their very drafting reflects a cautious balance between politics and activism.  
In undertaking this analysis, this article contributes to the existing body of 
literature in a number of ways. First, the article investigates the process of drafting and 
the potential impact of treaty bodies’ general recommendations, a generally under-
analysed form of soft law that nonetheless play a pivotal role in shaping jurisprudence 
and in turn, influencing not only other human rights treaties bodies but also national and 
international courts, tribunals and quasi-judicial institutions (Mechlem 2009, 929–30). 
Second, this article provides a critical analysis of the most recent recommendation, 
attempting to offer a more balanced evaluative approach when compared to the extensive 
praise that General Recommendation No. 35 has received to date (Chinkin 2017; 
Nousiainen 2017; European Women’s Lobby 2017). At the same time, I provide readers 
a perspective on the historical evolution of CEDAW’s approach to the topic given the 
passage of time under consideration. 
The value of the General Recommendation is not to be dismissed in this more 
critical account. In the words of one academic, “[i]n times of backlash, even taking stock 
and writing down positive developments of human rights law in the form of a 
recommendation helps to create more coherent and effective state practice in combating 
gendered violence against women” (Nousiainen 2017). However, in this account, I 
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identify gaps and areas of concern that can form future terrain for the CEDAW 
Committee to consider in the years to come. 
 
2. Time for an Update? An Historical and Contextual Assessment of the 
CEDAW Committee’s Approach to Violence against Women 
In this section, I analyse the contents and contributions of General Recommendations No. 
12 and No. 19. First, however, it is important to place the Recommendations in their 
historical context. Both of these general recommendations built on earlier and ongoing 
international dialogues on violence against women. This notably included the World 
Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women in Copenhagen in 1980 (United 
Nations 1980) and the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of 
the United Nations Decade for Women in 1985 in Nairobi (United Nations 1985). Despite 
this historical context, some academics have nonetheless noted how the CEDAW 
Committee’s decision to take on the issue of violence still added weight to those global 
declarations and in some respects called for “more aggressive” action (Englehart 2014, 
268). 
 
A first step: General Recommendation No. 12 (1989) 
While there was a noted absence of language on violence against women in CEDAW, 
evidence reflects the recognition it has been accorded by members of the CEDAW 
Committee. During the Committee’s first few sessions, questions on violence against 
women were addressed to States Parties regardless of whether it was covered in States 
Parties’ reports (Evatt 2002, 544). By the sixth session in 1987, a number of forms of 
violence had been discussed with States Parties, including domestic violence, rape and 
sexual offences, trafficking, prostitution, sex tourism, sexual harassment, abuse of 
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women prisoners, acid attacks, dowry deaths, and pornography and related advertising 
(framed by the Committee as a form of violence) (Evatt 2002, 544–45). This is a 
commendable and relatively broad list. Female Genital Mutilation (termed female 
circumcision by the CEDAW Committee) was raised in 1988 at the 7th session in 
dialogue with Senegal (Baldez 2014, 112).  
Yet, as of the 8th session in 1989, only 12 out of fifty-two state reports considered 
by the CEDAW Committee had provided information about the issue of violence (Evatt 
2002, 544–45). The limited attention in States Parties’ reports to violence against women 
explains both why General Recommendation No. 12 was issued and its relatively limited 
nature. There appears to have been understandable reticence among Committee members 
to expand via a General Recommendation on an issue that was neither explicitly included 
in CEDAW nor was necessarily one that was recognised as an obligation. In fact, the first 
thirteen general recommendations have been described by the academy as both brief and 
vague (Baldez 2014, 112), often merely urging governments to heed to existing 
guidelines (Baldez 2014, 113). In many respects, General Recommendation No. 12 was 
no different. It contained only one substantive recommendation, entirely focused on 
advising states on what information should be included in their periodic reports: (a) 
legislation in force to protect women against the incidence of different types of violence 
in various spaces e.g. in the family, in the workplace; (b) information on other measures 
adopted to eradicate violence; (c) the existence of support services for women victims; 
and (d) statistical data on incidence (CEDAW Committee 1989, 12). In hindsight, this 
limited elaboration on the issue of violence against women was a missed opportunity to 
elaborate more fully on how violence against women is an issue that sits squarely within 




Moreover, it is arguable that the Committee was slow to recognise the significant 
potential behind its ability to produce general recommendations. At its inception, the 
Committee was “seriously divided” on whether it could or should express interpretive 
views on the contents of CEDAW (Evatt 2002, 535). One review of the Committee’s 
work (just shy of a decade after CEDAW’s enactment but prior to the issuing of General 
Recommendation No. 12) is more forgiving. Andrew Byrnes has noted a number of 
factors that undermined but also explained the CEDAW Committee’s slow progress, 
including the limited number of annual meetings the Committee was able to conduct and 
its limited resources, including secretarial support, for even basic functioning (Byrnes 
1989, 60). 
Furthermore, the Committee’s funding source was distinct from some of the other 
Geneva-based treaty bodies, undermining cross-learning between them (Byrnes 1989, 
60–61). This in part explains why the Committee was comparatively less progressive than 
its fellow treaty bodies. For instance, at the time the Committee was debating its powers 
under Article 21, the Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD Committee) had already adopted six general recommendations, regarding 
reporting obligations with respect to several articles of the Convention on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and on overdue reports. Admittedly CERD had entered 
into force substantially earlier (in 1969), but its process of issuing general 
recommendations was a solid precedent given that CERD contains almost identical 
wording as Article 21 of CEDAW regarding the power of treaty bodies to develop general 
recommendations. The CEDAW Committee had tried and tested experiences from other 
human rights treaty bodies from which to learn.  
 
Acceleration in Progress: General Recommendation No. 19 (1992) 
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The CEDAW Committee’s slow progress and the brief nature of General 
Recommendation No. 12 were resolved in 1992 by General Recommendation No. 19. In 
fact, by the time the Committee had issued General Recommendation No. 14 on ‘female 
circumcision’ in 1990, its recommendations had begun to offer more specific direction to 
States Parties and incorporate the Committee’s accumulated knowledge (Baldez 2014, 
113). General Recommendation No. 19 was a further turning point, demonstrating a new 
level of depth of analysis.  
This General Recommendation was fundamental for two reasons. First, it 
accorded a proper status in international law to violence against women by inferring 
violence as a form of discrimination which could be captured by Article 1 of CEDAW. 
Violence against women was framed as being for the purpose of impairing women’s 
enjoyment of their human rights (Šimonović 2014, 599). Second, General 
Recommendation No. 19 offered a global definition for what is meant by the phrase 
“violence against women”: 
The definition of discrimination includes gender-based violence, that is, 
violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that 
affects women disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical, 
mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other 
deprivations of liberty. Gender-based violence may breach specific 
provisions of the Convention, regardless of whether those provisions 
expressly mention violence (CEDAW Committee 1992, para. 6).  
Notably, despite CEDAW’s silence on the issue of violence, the enactment of 
General Recommendation No. 19 was not seen as particularly contentious. To the 
contrary, Dubravka Simonović, the 4th UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against 
Women, its causes and consequences has contended that General Recommendation No. 
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19 was merely an effort to make clear a link between violence and discrimination that 
was already embedded in CEDAW (Simonovic 2014, 601). The CEDAW Committee has 
never been called upon to defend its decision to enact a general recommendation on the 
topic. Arguably, this reflects the universal recognition of the gravity of the problem. 
Englehart too notes both the positive reception, as well as the subsequent high level of 
compliance by States Parties with both General Recommendations No. 12 and No. 19 
(Englehart 2014, 268).  
The drafting process of General Recommendation No. 19 is also worth 
commenting on and commending. For the first time, the CEDAW Committee invited 
non-governmental organisations to contribute information to prepare background studies 
for Committee members to review (Evatt 2002, 546). This came at an opportune moment 
when women’s movements were pushing for gender-based violence to be seen as a state 
responsibility and “brought [it] into the very public arena of international human rights” 
(Evatt 2002, 550).  
In this vein, General Recommendation No. 19 was a fundamental advancement. 
It placed within CEDAW’s reach violence by private (CEDAW Committee 1992, para. 
9) as well as State actors (CEDAW Committee 1992, para. 8) and allocated responsibility 
to States for private acts if States Parties failed to act with due diligence to prevent, 
investigate, punish and provide for compensation (CEDAW Committee 1992, para. 9). 
Violence was named a human rights violation that threatened the right to life, the right to 
freedom from torture and the right to liberty and security, among other globally 
recognised human rights. 
Moreover, despite being a recommendation not specifically focused on women’s 
health – which was to come several years later in 1999 (General Recommendation No. 
24 on Women and Health) – the Committee nonetheless used the opportunity of the 1992 
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General Recommendation to speak to the issue of abortion. Specifically, General 
Recommendation No. 19 encouraged States Parties to ensure that women “are not forced 
to seek unsafe medical procedures such as illegal abortion because of lack of appropriate 
services in regard to fertility control” (CEDAW Committee 1992, para. 24(m)). Given 
the absence of any mention of abortion in CEDAW, this was clearly ground-breaking. It 
was the first mention of abortion in writing by the CEDAW Committee. This was 
followed by several concluding observations in 1997 where the Committee critiqued 
punitive abortion legislation and denied services in countries such as Morocco, Namibia, 
Luxembourg and Venezuela (Cook, Dickens, and Bliss 1999, 581–582). The reference to 
abortion in General Recommendation No. 19 helped open the door to the Committee’s 
dialogues with states on the issue.   
Overall, General Recommendation No. 19 offered further fuel for the existing 
momentum towards eliminating violence against women. For instance, the Declaration 
on the Elimination of Violence against Women was adopted by the UN General 
Assembly one year later (United Nations General Assembly 1993), recognising violence 
as a human rights violation and in several respects utilising language from General 
Recommendation No. 19 on the scope of acts as well as spaces of violence to be 
considered. In 1994, the UN Commission on Human Rights established the mandate of 
the Special Rapporteur on Violence, a role that has been commended by the Committee 
as complementary to its own work (CEDAW Committee 2017, para. 2). This is despite 
some debate suggesting competition between the work of UN Treaty Bodies in general 
and the Special Procedures established by the then Human Rights Commission (now 
Human Rights Council) (Rodley 2003, 882).  
Since issuing General Recommendation No. 19, violence against women has been 
a “cornerstone” of the Committee’s scrutiny of States Parties’ reports (Zwingel 2016, 
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220). At one point, it was the most frequently invoked of all the Committee’s General 
Recommendations at both the international and national levels (Byrnes and Bath 2008, 
519). The Committee itself has praised the 1992 General Recommendation as a “key 
catalyst” for the evolution of a prohibition of gender-based violence as a central principle 
of customary international law (CEDAW Committee 2017, para. 2). General 
Recommendation No. 19 has indeed proved worthy of its reputation as a landmark 
evolution in international women’s rights. 
 
Shortcomings with General Recommendation No.19 
Despite this well-deserved praise, I would argue that there are two substantial flaws with 
the drafting of General Recommendation No. 19. The first relates to the scope of women 
described as falling within its ambit. The second relates to the inadequate gravity with 
which violence against women and its consequences are discussed.  
General Recommendation No. 19 recognises “intersectional discrimination” – a 
concept introduced into human rights discourse as early as the 1980s (Crenshaw 1989, 
139; hooks 1981). Importantly it speaks to the limitations of “gender” as an overarching 
category (McCall 2005, 1771) and how multiple social identities, like gender, race, 
disability and sexual orientation, intersect at the micro level in individual experiences and 
reflects systems of privilege and oppression at the macro level (like racism, sexism or 
classism) (Bowleg 2012, 1267).  
However, General Recommendation No. 19 only does this as far as the 
vulnerability to violence experienced by rural women is concerned (CEDAW Committee 
1992, paras 21, 24(o)(q)). There was a failure to consider women of colour, women living 
with disabilities or violence perpetrated against a woman because of her sexual 
orientation. This is despite the fact that CERD came into force in January 1969, that 1981 
13 
 
to 1992 was the UN Decade of Disabled Persons, with the Standard Rules on Equalization 
of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities adopted by the General Assembly in 
December 1993 as a result (United Nations 1994). The latter notably speaks to the need 
to collect gender-specific statistics concerning the living conditions of persons with 
disabilities (United Nations 1994, sec. Rule 13(1)). The CEDAW Committee, therefore, 
would have been exposed to the ways in which other identities intersect with gender and 
exacerbate vulnerability to violence. It is not difficult to imagine how, for some of these 
“invisibilised” groups, General Recommendation No. 19 would have been a 
disappointment. Even if the structural separation of the treaty bodies noted by Byrnes and 
described above acts as some justification, the failure to include other vulnerable groups, 
or, at least, an open clause that would recognise their potential vulnerability, undermined 
the opportunity to accelerate dialogue by the CEDAW Committee on these intersecting 
identities in subsequent years. 
Second, in many respects, General Recommendation No. 19 failed to grapple with 
the gravity of the impact of violence on women’s lives. For example, among its 
recommendations, the Committee stated that different forms of violence in the family 
“put women’s health at risk and impair their ability to participate in family life and public 
life on a basis of equality” (CEDAW Committee 1992, para. 23). Yet, for many women 
who experience intimate partner violence – and there are countless efforts to document 
the magnitude of such violence (Watts and Zimmerman 2002; Venis and Horton 2002; 
Garcia-Moreno et al. 2006) – it profoundly inhibits women’s enjoyment of all of their 
human rights, with consequences that go beyond physical and mental health and 
“impaired” participation in family and public life. Christine Chinkin, in sustaining a 
similar critique, has challenged General Recommendation No. 19 for emphasising the 
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impact of violence on women’s physical and mental health rather than all rights at large 
(Chinkin 2017).  
In hindsight, we may want to forgive the Committee for its inability in those early 
years to articulate the gravity of gender-based violence and its impact on human rights. 
However, it was only one year later that feminist activists advanced the argument that 
domestic violence was a form of torture. In 1993, Rhonda Copelon persuasively argued 
that the battering and sexual abuse of women by their partners must be understood as 
torture, whereby the private nature of the act neither diminishes the atrociousness of the 
act nor the need for international sanction (Copelon 1993, 299), giving rise to obligatory 
national and international responsibilities. Copelon recognised in that piece that she was 
not the first woman activist to make this point (Copelon 1993, 296).  
By putting forward this thesis, Copelon, a human rights lawyer, activists and 
eminent scholar, was a key player in the development of global jurisprudence on a 
gendered perspective to violence, torture and the public/private divide. In a similar vein, 
the advancement of new critical thinking in the field of international human rights is a 
role that we hope – or should expect – a human rights treaty body to play. Surely this is 
the way in which the Committee can make a real contribution to the topic of gender-based 
violence. In this context, General Recommendation No. 19 reads as a somewhat weak 
statement on an issue that warranted greater status as a globally intolerable crime.  
 
3. Strengths and Limitations: An Assessment of General Recommendation 
No. 35 
In its title, General Recommendation No. 35 named its purpose as providing an update to 
General Recommendation No. 19. The Committee goes on to state that the 
Recommendation is aimed at “providing States parties with further guidance aimed at 
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accelerating the elimination of gender-based violence against women” (CEDAW 
Committee 2017, para. 3). In this section, I analyse the ways in which General 
Recommendation No. 35 can be considered an update on the earlier recommendation. I 
consider the extent to which General Recommendation No. 35 builds on an already fairly 
comprehensive framework and therefore makes a significant contribution to international 
law. I discuss whether the text goes far enough in terms of how we understand violence 
against women and the realities of how violence permeates women’s lives today. I note, 
too, the ways in which the Committee drew on its own learning from its jurisprudence 
over the last quarter of a century. 
Overall, General Recommendation No. 35 is indeed an advancement on the 1992 
instrument and in several ways, a significant one. It was also certainly needed given the 
passage of time. Nonetheless, I identify a number of shortcomings. 
  
Diplomatic Drafting Versus Women’s Movement Activism 
I begin by considering what I have described elsewhere in this article as the balancing 
exercise of the drafting process. At its 34th session, the Committee invited interested 
parties to submit comments in writing on the “Draft update of General Recommendation 
No. 19”. The Committee added a disclaimer: “After a thorough and due consideration of 
comments provided, only the Committee will decide on the contents of the final version 
of the update of General Recommendation No. 19.” Yet with a significant number of 
contributions – according to the General Recommendation itself, numbering in this case 
more than one hundred (CEDAW Committee 2017, Preamble)3 – the Committee was 
presented with the challenging task of drafting a recommendation that in some way 
                                                          
3 On the website of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 64 NGO submissions and 18 
submissions from ‘Other stakeholders’ are made available CEDAW Committee and have been reviewed 
for the purposes of this article 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/DraftUpdateGR19.aspx> visited on 13 July 2018. 
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recognised the contributions – and therefore the potentially differing priorities – of these 
stakeholders. 
Given the high number of stakeholders interested in the issue of gender-based 
violence overall – far greater than just the number of submissions – it is unsurprising that 
the General Recommendation begins by going through the protocol of acknowledging 
the efforts of the global community to combat violence over the previous decades. This 
includes the work of the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes 
and Consequences and countless civil society organisations as well as governments. 
Acknowledgement by the CEDAW Committee of both efforts and progress, despite the 
reality of such progress being slow and the problem of violence still being rife, is 
necessary and reassuring. 
These opening paragraphs act as a reminder that we are reading a UN document 
– the drafting of which is a balancing exercise. On the one hand, the CEDAW Committee 
recognises the contributions of individuals and organisations who lobbied for the 
inclusion of particular language with the hope of a final document that would be both 
expansive and progressive. On the other hand, the reserved nature of the drafting reminds 
readers that the Committee has to contend with those voices – particularly States Parties 
– who may be concerned about a human rights treaty body’s use (or mis-use) of the 
opportunity to expand on already established interpretations of women’s rights in 
international law through the issuance of a general recommendation.  
Indeed, if States Parties feel somehow compelled to comply with general 
recommendations as “authoritative interpretations” of the treaty, treaty bodies should feel 
a sense of responsibility to ensure methodically sound legal drafting of such 
recommendations (Mechlem 2009, 929). In the case of General Recommendation No. 35, 
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arguably the Committee engages in this balancing exercise at the expense of being able 
to filter through these submissions and develop a statement of its own. 
 
‘Gender-based’ Violence against Women 
The Committee’s use of the language of “gender-based violence” as opposed to “violence 
against women” is a significant advance on the previous recommendation. The 
Committee explicitly states that the General Recommendation is about “gender-based 
violence against women” i.e. these recommendations are not intended to cover gender-
based violence against men (CEDAW Committee 2017, para. 6). General 
Recommendation No. 35 in fact makes repeated used of the phrase “gender-based 
violence”, including in its title (this language also appears in General Recommendation 
No. 19, but not in the title). Given that this phrasing appears in the earlier 
recommendation, we could assume its usage is non-contentious. However, the 
implications are significant. The choice of language is deliberate: the language of 
“gender-based violence” frames the issue “as a social rather than an individual problem” 
(CEDAW Committee 2017, para. 9). It also acts as a reminder to States Parties, advocates 
and other readers that gender-based violence against women is a gendered structural 
problem, embedded in unequal power relationships between men and women.  
The Committee also makes an important statement about what drives but also 
sustains gender-based violence, including the “ideology of men’s entitlement and 
privilege over women, social norms regarding masculinity, the need to assert male control 
or power, enforce gender roles, or prevent, discourage or punish what is considered to be 
unacceptable female behaviour” (CEDAW Committee 2017, para. 19). These factors 
“contribute to explicit or implicit social acceptance of gender-based violence against 
women” (CEDAW Committee 2017, para. 19). In turn, the more deliberate and repeated 
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use of “gender-based violence” reflects the reality that combating such violence requires 
much more fundamental change than may have been stipulated in previous 
recommendations. Ending gender-based violence is not merely about services for 
victims, prosecuting perpetrators, quantifying prevalence – all of which are extremely 
important – but about “deeper social transformation of gender orders and gender 
relations” (Kelly 2005, 491).  
 
 
An Expansive List of Violence-Related Concerns 
The Committee elaborates on the multiple forms that gender-based violence may take 
(CEDAW Committee 2017, para. 14) and the various external factors that affect and often 
exacerbate violence, from cultural or economic factors to increased globalization to 
conflict and terrorism (CEDAW Committee 2017, para. 14). In contrast to the 1992 
document, the Committee acknowledges the expansive jurisprudence indicating that 
gender-based violence may amount to torture and specifically in the context of 
international criminal law, notes that violence may constitute a crime against humanity 
or war crime, namely rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and 
enforced sterilization (CEDAW Committee 2017, para. 16). It is globally accepted that 
violence today transcends national boundaries (CEDAW Committee 2017, para. 6). The 
Committee also notes how violence occurs today in previously less-considered domains 
such as “technology-mediated settings” (CEDAW Committee 2017, para. 20).  
Moreover, certain issues are dealt with in significant detail. For example, the 
Committee elaborates substantively on the use of mediation and conciliation in violence. 
It recommends strict regulation of practices such as mediation and conciliation, including 
their use only after evaluation by a specialised team, with guarantees of free and informed 
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consent by the affected victim. The Committee explicitly states, “These alternative 
procedures should not constitute an obstacle to women’s access to formal justice” 
(CEDAW Committee 2017, para. 45). To offer another example, the financial inequalities 
facing many women are explicitly acknowledged with the Committee recommending 
access to financial aid and free or low-cost high quality legal aid, medical, psychosocial 
and other services for women survivors and their family members (CEDAW Committee 
2017, para. 41(c)).  
The Committee’s General Recommendation in many respects makes a powerful 
statement about the indivisible nature of women’s human rights. It emphasises how 
gender-based violence is intimately linked with forced marriage, the performance of 
medical procedures on women with disabilities without their informed consent, and the 
criminalisation of abortion or being lesbian, bisexual or transgender, being in prostitution 
or committing adultery (CEDAW Committee 2017, para. 31(a)). 
 
Intersectional Discrimination 
General Recommendation No. 35 makes clear, and does so unapologetically, that 
different women are more vulnerable to violence and suffer violence more gravely based 
on intersecting identities, including but certainly not limited to race, marital status, age, 
disability and sexual orientation. General Recommendation No. 35 therefore elaborates 
substantially on what is a very limited treatment of intersectional discrimination in the 
earlier General Recommendation No. 19 as noted above. 
While the 1992 General Recommendation spoke largely to the heightened 
vulnerability of women to violence based on their rural status, the 2017 recommendation 
provides a non-exhaustive and extensive list of intersections that have an “aggravating 
negative impact” on particular women and notes how gender-based violence affects 
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women to different degrees and in different ways. This includes based on a woman’s 
ethnicity/race, indigenous or minority status, colour, socio-economic status and/or caste, 
language, religion or belief, political opinion, national origin, marital and/or maternal 
status, age, urban/rural location, health status, disability, property ownership, being 
lesbian, bisexual, transgender or intersex, illiteracy and the list goes on (CEDAW 
Committee 2017, para. 12). 
This approach to intersectionality is certainly in line with the CEDAW 
Committee’s own evolving jurisprudence, as well as that of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the gendered aspects of racial discrimination and 
its discussions concerning Roma people and the jurisprudence of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the right to health (Truscan and Bourke-
Martignoni 2016, 111–21; Chow 2016, 467–70). By recognising in such expansive form 
intersectional discrimination, General Recommendation No. 35 is a significant advance 
on the previous recommendation. It also highlights how identity and dignity together sit 
at the heart of discrimination (Chow 2016, 481).  
While the treatment of intersectional discrimination is comparably noteworthy, in 
a number of respects, the Committee has not gone beyond rectifying the previous gap in 
the identities listed in its earlier recommendation. For instance, there is an absence of 
clear analysis concerning how these multiple identities actually affect different women’s 
levels of vulnerability to violence, or experiences as survivors of violence. This problem 
once again speaks to the overarching issue of the lack of depth of analysis in this 
Recommendation.  
It is also important to note that that intersectionality as a concept has been as much 
critiqued as it has been praised. For instance, several authors note its excessive focus on 
subgroups and their inequality and its limited ability to speak to how overarching 
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structures like patriarchy, racism, capitalism and sexism sustain inequality (Conaghan 
2009; Chow 2016, 455, 472–73). Yet, these are in fact common drivers of gender-based 
inequality, discrimination and marginalisation across all the identities named in General 
Recommendation No. 35. Recognition by the Committee of these conceptual limitations 
with the notion of intersectionality are absent from the General Recommendation. 
 
“Modern-Day Concerns”: Too Reactive or Adaptive to Today’s Advocacy? 
General Recommendation No. 35 names a number of issues as modern-day concerns in 
its attempt to bring the recommendation into the 21st Century, an important consideration 
given the lapse in time since the previous recommendation. These include the impact of 
austerity measures on women’s access to state services, as well as so-called “shrinking 
democratic spaces”, that is, heightened regulation of political protests and public debates 
in the name of state security (CEDAW Committee 2017, para. 7). 
Another issue that has gained increasing traction since the early 2000s (ActionAid 
2016; UN Women 2017) is the issue of women’s safety in public spaces. Improvements 
to physical infrastructure such as lighting in urban and rural settings, and particularly in 
and around schools has been demanded (CEDAW Committee 2017, para. 35). The 
Committee has done well to bring these issues to the fore. 
These references in the General Recommendation reflect much of the present-day 
discussion at the time of its drafting (see for instance the origins behind ‘Feminist 
Dissent’ 2017). However, the Committee’s response to current debates is uncritical, 
without offering necessary and potentially useful insights into the relationship between, 
for example, the so-called shrinking political spaces and its impact on discrimination 
against women, let alone gender-based violence against women. There is a startling lack 
of evidence or examples (or citations) to back the Committee’s narrative on these points. 
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For instance, the Committee argues that there is a “consequent deterioration of the rule 
of law” (CEDAW Committee 2017, para. 7) and concludes its limited analysis by then 
presuming a link between the concerns raised and the pervasiveness of gender-based 
violence and a persistent culture of impunity.  
Readers are left to either accept the singular stance that the Committee takes on 
these points or to question the knowledge base on which these recommendations were 
drafted. To the contrary, the Committee had readily available examples at hand that 
would make clear the links between State and non-State based controls and the limitations 
placed on women’s political action, such as the documented assaults on female protesters 
and journalists during and immediately after the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, 
in 2010 (Hafez 2012, 37; Johansson-Nogués 2013, 393) or how reductions in spending 
on public services in Europe, for instance, limited the support available for women 
survivors of violence between 2010 and 2012 (Towers and Walby 2012) or the limitations 
posed on civil society space for debate and dissent (Silliman 1999; Transnational Institute 
2017). While the Committee may have been restricted in their drafting on this issue – not 
wanting to offer sporadic examples but also knowing that a comprehensive list was not 
feasible – the lack of concrete examples to evidence the argument severely undermines 
the Committee’s claims. 
While efforts by the CEDAW Committee to incorporate these present-day drivers 
in some ways heightens the Committee’s current relevance, without supporting evidence 
the Committee appears selective in its drafting. Moreover, while it is important to 
recognise that these issues are indeed directly relevant to the issue of gender-based 
violence, the Committee fails to frame the issues in a way that enables the Committee to 
either be forward thinking - i.e. what could be the direct impact on violence against 
women in the years to come as a result of these developments – or substantive in 
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providing recommendations to States Parties. The broad-brush naming of tradition, 
culture, religion, fundamentalist ideologies, austerity measures and shrinking political 
spaces therefore fails to speak to the stated goal of the General Recommendation of 
“providing states parties with further guidance” (CEDAW Committee 2017, para. 20) 
aimed at accelerating the end of gender-based violence. 
Moreover, each of these issues is presumed to be a substantial barrier to women’s 
rights. However, one could question, for instance, whether we are in fact facing a 
reduction in democratic political space in light of far-reaching access to the internet 
(albeit by no means universal) and the proliferation and recognition of blogging as a form 
of acknowledged and legitimate writing. In places where access is not limited, on the one 
hand, online technology has created new digital spaces for violence, as the CEDAW 
Committee recognises (CEDAW Committee 2017, para. 20) but on the other hand, it 
creates new spaces for women’s rights activists to safely document and report their 
experiences of violence and proposition for change.  
 
4. Untouched Terrain: Future Work of the CEDAW Committee 
The CEDAW Committee, like all human rights treaty bodies, has the authority – as 
established in its own Article 21 – to interpret the convention in a way that has facilitated 
some significant conceptual advances in our understanding of human rights. General 
Recommendation No. 35 offered the potential to be such an advance and it delivers in 
several respects. It is a detailed recommendation that reaffirms global statements on 
gender-based violence and how it impedes women’s enjoyment of their rights. It also 
draws on evolving jurisprudence in relation to women’s access to justice, forms of torture, 
due diligence of governments, abortion, sex education and sexual orientation, to name 
just a few examples. 
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However, in many ways, it is arguable that General Recommendation No. 35 
reads as a shopping list of examples of gender-based violence and related contextual 
issues. As noted above, this partly reflects the Committee’s attempt to respond to the very 
high number of contributions it received from NGOs and agencies when the update to 
General Recommendation No. 19 was proposed. All of these contributors understandably 
wanted to see their concerns – or even their proposed language – reflected in the final 
text. What results, however, is somewhat of a cut and paste exercise rather than a 
particularly insightful new way of thinking about the topic.  
Another perspective, however, is to appreciate the inclusive nature of the General 
Recommendation. It addresses – to some degree – a multitude of issues that have come 
to the fore as having some relationship with violence against women. This spans a number 
of issues from sexual and reproductive health to online violence to forced mediation 
among women survivors of violence after divorce or separation. It could be argued that 
there is little missing. For example, the Committee should be commended for once again 
using the opportunity posed by General Recommendation No. 35 to defend the position 
that reservations to Articles 2 and 16 of CEDAW are considered incompatible with the 
Convention and thus impermissible (CEDAW Committee 2017, para. 13). This is one 
instance where the cursory mention of an issue is nonetheless positive. 
Unfortunately, however, we cannot ignore the fact that many issues are dealt with 
in too a cursory manner and therefore fall short of providing concrete guidance to States 
Parties on their obligations and how to fulfil them. Non-refoulement and refugee status 
on the basis of gender-based violence is one such issue. In light of the CEDAW 
Committee’s extensive jurisprudence on the issue on the extra-territorial obligations of 
States parties regarding gender-based violence, more attention might have been expected 
(CEDAW Committee 2013). In contrast, in a few brief phrases, the Committee affirms 
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that protection and support measures and services should be available irrespective of a 
woman’s residence status or their willingness to cooperate in proceedings against an 
alleged perpetrator, reiterating that States Parties should respect the principle of non-
refoulement (CEDAW Committee 2017, para. 41).  
The passing – albeit clear – reference to gender-based violence as related to 
criminalised abortion is another example, as is the statement that vulnerability to gender-
based violence is heightened in states where being bisexual, lesbian and transgendered is 
criminalised. Given the CEDAW Committee has been criticised by several influential 
academics (Nussbaum 2016, 608) on its cursory treatment of such issues, these passing 
references may create a need for a follow-up recommendation in a much shorter span of 
time than the 25 years that passed between the second and third recommendations on 
gender-based violence against women.  
However, as the Committee itself notes, the General Recommendation cannot be 
read in isolation. It builds upon General Recommendation No. 19. It also complements 
other General Recommendations related to women migrant workers, older women, 
women in conflict, women refugees, asylum seekers and stateless women, rural women 
and on women’s access to justice (CEDAW Committee 2017, para. 11). It joins a more 
comprehensive and complete body of soft and hard law on women’s human rights. 
There is hope therefore. General Recommendation No. 35, although a document 
with some flaws, may help to further reduce the incidence of gender-based violence and 
to guide governments on the necessary legislative, policy and practical reforms needed 
to support victims and address impunity. At the very least, it is an opportunity to remind 
the international community that although violence against women went from being a 










ActionAid. 2016. ‘Safe Cities for Women’. 2016. 
http://www.actionaid.org/safecitiesforwomen. 
Baldez, Lisa. 2014. Defying Convention: US Resistance to the UN Treaty on Women’s 
Rights. Cambridge University Press. 
Bowleg, Lisa. 2012. ‘The Problem with the Phrase Women and Minorities: 
Intersectionality-an Important Theoretical Framework for Public Health’. 
American Journal of Public Health 102 (7): 1267–73. 
https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2012.300750. 
Byrnes, Andrew. 1989. ‘The Other Human Rights Treaty Body: The Work of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women’. Yale Journal 
of International Law 14: 1. 
Byrnes, Andrew, and Eleanor Bath. 2008. ‘Violence against Women, the Obligation of 
Due Diligence, and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women—Recent Developments’. 
Human Rights Law Review 8 (3): 517–33. https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngn022. 
CEDAW Committee. 1989. ‘General Recommendation 12 Violence against Women 
(Eighth Session, 1989)’. 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/1_Global/I
NT_CEDAW_GEC_5831_E.pdf. 
———. 1992. General Recommendation No. 19, Violence against Women (Eleventh 
Session, 1993). U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/1992/L.1/Add.15 (1992). 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/gencomm/generl19.htm. 
———. 2013. ‘M. N. N v Denmark - Communication No. 33/2011: Decision Adopted 





———. 2017. ‘General Recommendation No. 35 on Gender-Based Violence against 
Women, Updating General Recommendation No. 19’. 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/1_Global/C
EDAW_C_GC_35_8267_E.pdf. 
———. 2018. ‘Launch of CEDAW General Recommendation No. 35’. 2018. 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/GR35.aspx. 
Chinkin, Christine. 2017. ‘CEDAW General Recommendation 35 on Violence against 
Women Is a Significant Step Forward’. LSE Women, Peace and Security Blog 
(blog). 6 September 2017. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2017/09/06/cedaw-general-
recommendation-35-on-violence-against-women-is-a-significant-step-forward/. 
Chow, Pok Yin S. 2016. ‘Has Intersectionality Reached Its Limits? Intersectionality in 
the UN Human Rights Treaty Body Practice and the Issue of Ambivalence’. 
Human Rights Law Review 16 (3): 453–81. https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngw016. 
Conaghan, Joanne. 2009. ‘Intersectionality and the Feminist Project in Law’. In 
Intersectionality and beyond: Law, Power and the Politics of Location, edited 
by Davina Cooper. Vol. 1st Ed. London: Routledge Cavendish. 
https://kar.kent.ac.uk/1900/. 
Cook, R J, B M Dickens, and L E Bliss. 1999. ‘International Developments in Abortion 
Law from 1988 to 1998.’ American Journal of Public Health 89 (4): 579–86. 
https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.89.4.579. 
Copelon, Rhonda. 1993. ‘Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic 
Violence as Torture’. Columbia Human Rights Law Review 25: 291. 
29 
 
Crenshaw, Kimberle. 1989. ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A 
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and 
Antiracist Politics’. The University of Chicago Legal Forum 140: 139–167. 
Division for the Advancement of Women. 2009. ‘CEDAW Committee to Start Work on 
General Recommendation No. 26’. 2009. 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recommendation
s-26.htm. 
Englehart, Neil. 2014. ‘CEDAW and Gender Violence: An Empirical Assessment’. 
Michigan State Law Review 2014 (2): 265. 
European Women’s Lobby. 2017. ‘New CEDAW General Recommendation 35 
Prioritises Gender-Based Violence against Women’. 15 September 2017. 
https://www.womenlobby.org/New-CEDAW-General-Recommendation-35-
prioritises-gender-based-violence-against. 
Evatt, Elizabeth. 2002. ‘Finding a Voice for Women’s Rights: The Early Days of 
CEDAW’. George Washington International Law Review 34: 515. 
‘Feminist Dissent’. 2017. University of Warwick. 2017. 
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/english/research/currentprojects/feministdissent/. 
Garcia-Moreno, Claudia, Henrica AFM Jansen, Mary Ellsberg, Lori Heise, and 
Charlotte H Watts. 2006. ‘Prevalence of Intimate Partner Violence: Findings 
from the WHO Multi-Country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic 
Violence’. The Lancet 368 (9543): 1260–69. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-
6736(06)69523-8. 
Grover, Leena. 2012. UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy. 
Cambridge University Press. 
30 
 
Hafez, Sherine. 2012. ‘No Longer a Bargain: Women, Masculinity, and the Egyptian 
Uprising’. American Ethnologist 39 (1): 37–42. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-
1425.2011.01344.x. 
hooks, bell. 1981. Ain’t I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism. Boston, MA: South 
End Press. 
Johansson-Nogués, Elisabeth. 2013. ‘Gendering the Arab Spring? Rights and 
(in)Security of Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan Women’. Security Dialogue 44 
(5–6): 393–409. 
Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy 
Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Kelly, Liz. 2005. ‘Inside Outsiders: Mainstreaming Violence against Women into 
Human Rights Discourse and Practice’. International Feminist Journal of 
Politics 7 (4): 471–95. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616740500284391. 
McCall, Leslie. 2005. ‘The Complexity of Intersectionality’. Signs: Journal of Women 
in Culture and Society 30 (3): 1771–1800. https://doi.org/10.1086/426800. 
Mechlem, Kerstin. 2009. ‘Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights’. 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 42 (3): 905–47. 
Nousiainen, Kevät. 2017. ‘CEDAW Committee General Recommendation on Violence 
against Women Updated’. Oxford Human Rights Hub (blog). 14 September 
2017. http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/cedaw-committee-general-recommendation-on-
violence-against-women-updated/. 
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2016. ‘Women’s Progress and Women’s Human Rights’. Human 
Rights Quarterly 38 (3): 589–622. https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2016.0043. 
Rodley, Nigel S. 2003. ‘United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies and Special 
Procedures of the Commission on Human Rights--Complementarity or 
31 
 
Competition?’ Human Rights Quarterly 25 (4): 882–908. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2003.0051. 
Silliman, Jael. 1999. ‘Expanding Civil Society: Shrinking Political Spaces— The Case 
of Women’s Nongovernmental Organizations’. Social Politics: International 
Studies in Gender, State & Society 6 (1): 23–53. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/sp/6.1.23. 
Simonovic, Dubravka. 2014. ‘Global and Regional Standards on Violence Against 
Women: The Evolution and Synergy of the CEDAW and Istanbul Conventions’. 
Human Rights Quarterly; Baltimore 36 (3): 590-606,689. 
Šimonović, Dubravka. 2014. ‘Global and Regional Standards on Violence Against 
Women: The Evolution and Synergy of the CEDAW and Istanbul Conventions’. 
Human Rights Quarterly 36 (3): 590–606. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2014.0040. 
Towers, Jude, and Sylvia Walby. 2012. ‘Measuring the Impact of Cuts in Public 
Expenditure on the Provision of Services  to Prevent Violence against Women 
and Girls’. Northern Rock Foundation and Trust for London. 
Transnational Institute. 2017. ‘On “Shrinking Space”: A Framing Paper’. Transnational 
Institute. https://www.tni.org/files/publication-
downloads/on_shrinking_space_2.pdf. 
Truscan, Ivona, and Joanna Bourke-Martignoni. 2016. ‘International Human Rights 
Law and Intersectional Discrimination’. The Equal Rights Review 16: 103–31. 





United Nations. 1980. World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women: 
Equality, Development and Peace. A/CONF.94/35. 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/otherconferences/Nairobi/Nairobi
%20Full%20Optimized.pdf. 
———. 1985. Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the 
Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development 
and Peace. A/CONF.116/28/Rev.1. 
———. 1994. Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with 
Disabilities. GA/RES/48/96. 
Venis, Sarah, and Richard Horton. 2002. ‘Violence against Women: A Global Burden’. 
The Lancet 359 (9313): 1232. 
Watts, Charlotte, and Catherine Zimmerman. 2002. ‘Violence against Women: Global 
Scope and Magnitude’. The Lancet 359 (9313): 1232–37. 
Zwingel, Susanne. 2016. Translating International Women’s Rights: The CEDAW 
Convention in Context. Palgrave Macmillan. 
https://www.thegreatbritishbookshop.co.uk/book/susanne-zwingel/translating-
international-women-s-rights-the-cedaw-convention-in-context-2016. 
 
 
